Security & Vulnerability Analysis of Wireless Messaging Protocols & Applications
Origin: http://www.securitydocs.com/pdf/3026.PDF
Security & Vulnerability Analysis of Wireless Messaging Protocols & Applications
by: Atique Ahmed Khan, 02/21/2005
http://www.securitydocs.com/library/3026
Section 1. Introduction
Abstract
Wireless messaging is now a dynamic ingredient in the communication modes of our life. Many
applications over the Internet now use wireless messages to contact with the enduser. This paper
describes the messaging infrastructure and the related protocols used in this scenario. It also presents
many ways you can use the wireless networks to talk with your applications. There is also a growing
concern over how much these services are secure and how they can be compromised, which are
described briefly in this presentation.
About the author
Atique Ahmed Khan is a web developer in the country’s leading stock exchange, an organization whose
online system provides stock trading over the Internet. He has also developed Wireless SCADA
(Supervisory Control & Data Acquisition System) to control appliances over the web, WAP and by
using SMS in his graduation project. For comments about this tutorial, please contact at
nimbus81@yahoo.com
Overview of this paper
Starting with a brief introduction of telecommunication infrastructure and wireless messaging protocols,
the discussion will move towards the integration of wireless networks and the Internet. Some success
stories of SMS-powered applications and ways to develop them are presented. Finally security threats
and their effective measures to protect them are presented.
Section 2. Cellular communication networks
Reading the air
GSM (Global System for Mobile Communication) is the most common wireless system in the world.
Along with the telephony services, it also provides non-voice services called data (bearer) services.
These include General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) for packet switched network connection, Short
Message Service (SMS) that can contain alphanumeric characters, audio and video contents, facsimile
and email facility. A core GSM network contains the following components to perform the
telephony/data service:
Mobile Station
BTS
BSC
MSC
The Registers (HLR, VLR, AUC, EIR)
STP
SMSC
Mobile Station
This is the equipment from where the user initiates the wireless services. It can be a mobile phone or a
hardware component such as GSM modem. Nowadays, many modern types of equipment can do the
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communicators. All of them resemble in the air interface and the way they receive the data from wireless
network, but their features can be a lot more different.
Base Transceiver Station (BTS)
A very common sign found in the urban area is the tower painted with white and red strips. This is the
Base Transceiver Station, or BTS in short. Its main functioning is to provide the air interface to the
mobile equipment, that is, a pure wireless connection with the mobile phone. All the data to and from
the communication network is transferred to the mobile phone using the BTS. It has a very short
coverage area (or cells); so many BTSs are installed on strategic positions over the country to provide
seamless service for end-users.
Base Station Controller (BSC)
Base Station Controller (BSC) provides all the control functions and physical link between the BTS and
Mobile Service Switching Center (MSC). It is actually a high capacity switch providing handover
among cells, control of Radio Frequency (RF) power levels in BTSs and monitors the BTSs in its
Location Area (LA).
Mobile Service Switching Center (MSC)
It is the core component and the heart of cellular network. It has multi functions and some very
important data resides over here. It performs the telephony switching functions of the system and
controls call to and from other telephones and data systems. MSC acts like a standard exchange and
performs registration, authentication, location updating, handovers, call routing to other subscribers and
roaming etc. Various databases assist MSC in executing the above-described actions, commonly called
registers.
The Registers
Home Location Register (HLR)
Home Location Register (HLR) is a database used for the storage and management of
subscriptions. It contains permanent data about a subscriber and its profile, pointer to current
Visitor Location Register (VLR), other information and activity status like whether the mobile is
switched on or not. The data needed by MSC is provided by HLR includes International Mobile
Station Identification (IMSI), Mobile Station ISDN (MSISDN) and current VLR address.
Visitor Location Register (VLR)
Visitor Location Register (VLR) is a database for temporary information about subscribers needed
by MSC to serve visiting subscribers and mobile roaming into new MSC. It has the current
location of mobile station and administration information.
Authentication Center (AUC)
Authentication Center (AUC) stores parameters for encryption to user’s identity and
confidentiality. It is a protected database containing the copy of secret key stored in the Subscriber
Identity Module (SIM) that is used for authentication and encryption over radio channels. It is
needed normally when the mobile station is turned on and with each incoming/outgoing call. An
authentication will be successful if the security code at AUC matches with that stored in the SIM.
Equipment Identity Register (EIR)
Equipment Identity Register (EIR) is a database for identity of mobile equipment, preventing calls
from stolen, defective or unauthorized mobile phones. It contains a list of valid mobile phones
identified by International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI). Other lists includes:
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Just like black, gray and white hats!
Signaling Transfer Point (STP)
A good analogy to understand the Signaling Transfer Point (STP) is the network router, whose task is to
route traffic on the Internet. An STP performs routing, address translation and failover functionality. Just
like the Internet router uses TCP/IP protocol, STP uses SS7, commonly known as C7. Multiple
dedicated high capacity access paths exist among several STPs for reliable connections, since they carry
a huge amount of data and they are responsible for the transportation of all the traffic. With the increase
in pressure of telephony and bearer services, many carriers are in need of cost-effective, high bandwidth
inter-STP connections, and they are planning to migrate over IP networks using SS7 over IP SIGTRAN
standards.
Short Message Service Center (SMSC)
Short Message Service Center (SMSC) is a place where all the SMS are brought before they are sent to
their destination. It uses store-and-forward technique for SMS transfer, as the recipient mobile station
may be turned off, or it could be out of range. So the SMS is stored as long as it is not delivered to the
destination. Only a successful delivery to recipient or a time out (normally three days) will delete the
entry from the SMSC.
1 message received
Take a brief look of what we have been studying in this section. Suppose a message from mobile station
is written and destined to be sent to another mobile station that is turned off at the moment. The message
will be received from mobile equipment by BTS and passed to BSC, MSC and the core network, until it
finally reaches to SMSC. At this moment, an acknowledgement is sent to the sender mobile equipment
and ‘Message Sent’ will be displayed over the screen of the sender. Now the message is stored in the
SMSC, it requests HLR to provide the information about the recipient status. Unfortunately HLR
responds that the recipient’s mobile phone is switched off and tells the SMSC to wait. When the mobile
phone is turned on, the HLR will notify the SMSC and provides the correct MSC address to route the
address. SMSC then delivers the message to MSC and MSC will send the message to indicated BSC by
checking out the location of mobile equipment through local VLR. BTS will receive message from BSC
and finally delivers the message to recipient’s mobile phone.
Section 3. Wireless messaging protocols
Sneaking into the wires
In order to talk directly to the SMSC, the application must understand the protocol over which SMSC
communicates, and a plethora of protocols exist made by the SMSC vendors. These are the protocols
that handle data transfer over the wires in the form of packets, between an application or network
component to SMSC. The vendor-specific protocols make the life of application developers uneasy, as
they have to make customized changes in their application for different SMSC. Nevertheless some of the
protocols that cover major market share are as follows:
SMPP 3.4 by SMS Forum
White List: It contains good IMEIs.
Black List: It contains bad or stolen handsets.
Gray List: It contains uncertain IMEIs, whose characteristics are doubtful.
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SMS2000 OIS 4.0 by Sema Group
CIMD2 by Nokia
TAP & SMTP
Short Message Peer to Peer (SMPP)
The SMS Forum is responsible to nurture the most popular SMS protocol. It is the widely accepted
protocol that is used by major SMSC vendors and application softwares. Currently SMPP version 3.4 is
used over the network, and many development toolkits are available to write programs that can
understand this protocol. Using this interface, an external Short Message Entity such as a Paging or
VoiceMail system may bind/unbind to the SMSC, submit, cancel, replace and query short messages.
The SMSC forwards responses and short messages (e.g. delivery receipts, pager messages) to the
external Short Message Entity.
Universal Computer Protocol (UCP)
European Telecommunication Standards Institute (ETSI) formally used the Universal Computer
Protocol, or UCP for short, for paging networks. It is the strong competitor of SMPP in Western Europe,
a place where SMS market is successful. UCP version 3.5 is nowadays used and supported by most
SMSC vendors. An innovative trend will be provided along with UCP 4.0, in which content-based
reverse charging can become possible, so its popularity is expected to rise sharply.
Open Interface Specifications (OIS)
The Open Interface Specification (OIS) was originated by Sema Group, now owned by Schlumberger.
OIS is not so popular as SMPP or UCP, but it is as important as other protocols. This is because OIS is
the only SMS application protocol that makes Vodafone networks accessible, the world’s largest
network of cellular communication. OIS version 5.1 is used nowadays that is supported by
Schlumberger and CMG SMSCs.
Computer Interface to Message Distribution (CIMD)
The well-known Finnish-based company Nokia created the Computer-Interface to Message Distribution
(CIMD2). It is used in very few networks and only on Nokia’s SMSCs, but its importance is now
diminishing because of Nokia SMSCs are now capable to understand SMPP and UCP.
Telocator Alphanumeric Protocol (TAP) and Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP)
American-originated protocol, the Telocator Alphanumeric Protocol (TAP) was originally used for two-
way paging networks. Its importance is unique in a sense that it is used to interconnect SMS networks
and the American paging networks, and porting the pagingpowered applications to SMS networks. It is
supposed to be a legacy system and does not support sending the ring tones, picture messages and so on.
Not a good choice for the development of SMS applications.
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) guys defined the SMTP and never thought that it can be
used other than sending the emails, but many network providers are rolling the email addresses that are
similar to the subscriber’s phone number and any mail sent to that number can be received as a wireless
message. Mostly the SMTP is used for sending the multi-media messages to the mobile phones, reading
and posting the mails from the mobile phones.
Section 4. SMPP over TCP/IP
Out in the wild
Just like other Internet packets traveling across the networks, an SMPP packet can travel freely over IP
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Programming Interfaces (APIs) and toolkits, these unique packets can be created and sent to the wireless
messaging networks by using computer networks. Thus TCP/IP can be used as an underlying protocol
for the communication between an application and SMSC. Note that External Short Message Entity
(ESME) refers to such external sources and sinks of short messages as Voice Processing Systems, WAP
Proxy Servers or Message Handling computers. It specifically excludes SMEs, which are located within
the Mobile Network, i.e., a mobile station (MS).
The general format of an SMPP PDU consists of a PDU header followed by a PDU body as outlined in
the following table:
PDU Header - The SMPP Header is a mandatory part of every SMPP PDU and must always be
present.
PDU Body - The SMPP PDU Body is optional and may not be included with every SMPP PDU.
Command Length - Defines the total octet length of the SMPP PDU packet, including the length
field. The Command Length field is 4 octets long.
Command ID - Identifies the particular SMPP PDU, e.g., submit_sm, query_sm, etc. The
Command ID field is 4 octets long.
Command Status - Indicates the success or failure of an SMPP request. It is relevant only in the
SMPP response PDU and it must contain a NULL value in an SMPP request PDU. The Command
Status field is 4 octets long.
Sequence Number - Contains a sequence number that allows SMPP requests and responses to be
associated for correlation purposes. The use of sequence numbers for message correlation allows
SMPP PDUs to be exchanged asynchronously. The Sequence Number field is 4 octets long.
Mandatory Parameters - Following the header is a set of mandatory parameters, corresponding to
the SMPP PDU defined in the Command ID field.
Optional Parameters - Optional parameters corresponding to the SMPP PDU defined in the
Command ID field, and included as required.
Length - Indicates the length (in octets) of the Value field. The Length field is 2 octets long.
A Message Transfer Scenario (from ESME to SMSC)
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The ESME first initiates a connection with SMSC in ‘transmitter’ mode (BIND TRANSMITTER 1). If
the credentials submitted are valid, the SMSC will acknowledge the connection (RESPONSE 1). If the
SMSC is free to serve the ESME, it generates the request to handover the message (DELIVER MSG 2).
Upon receiving this signal, the ESME will acknowledge it (RESPONSE 2) and transfers the message
along with recipient’s necessary information (SUBMIT MSG 3). If the data transfer is successful, the
SMSC will generate an acknowledgement to it (RESPONSE 3). If the ESME does not wish to send
another message, it generates unbind request (UNBIND 4), which is granted by SMSC (RESPONSE 4),
and the connection is closed.
Section 5. Current wireless messaging applications
Success stories
In general, wireless messaging applications can be categorized into three kinds of services; Information
Services, Location-Based Services (LBS), Communication and Entertainment Services. These cover the
major market share in real world today. Some of the most successful messaging services are described
below:
Citibank (Personal Alerts & Notifications)
Shazam (Personal Alerts & Notifications)
Jurong Point (LBS)
KDDI (LBS & Remote Tracking)
BattleMail (Entertainment)
SMS2Email & IM (Communication & Entertainment)
Citialerts – Wireless Banking
Citibank Middle East provides its customers s service that can send alerts related to their spending habits
and withdrawals, as well as the latest movements in the Stock Markets of the world. It is a service that
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prices.
Shazam Entertainment – Song Tagging
Shazam has developed a real-time song identification service. Any sound track a customer hears can be
identified by this service. A 15 second sound sample is fetched and send by the customer to Shazam via
SMS, and within seconds a comprehensive reply can be received containing the name of the song and
the artist, moreover information regarding how to purchase the album can also be sent.
Jurong Point – Location-Based Marketing
By identifying the nearest cell to the mobile phone, network operators can gain a rough idea where the
customer is and that information is used to push information according to the surroundings of the
recipients. In the above mentioned shopping center, the shoppers receive a series of short messages as
long as they stay within the shopping area, concerning about the shop events and incentives in the
shopping mall.
KDDI – In - Car Telemetry
Telematics deals with the route guidance is another Location-Based Service (LBS). The recipients of
messages from this service are directed about shortest routes, traffic congestions ahead, GPS tracking
and text based directions in guiding the drivers from unknown regions.
BattleMail – Mobile KungFu
A worldwide competition in which players can challenge one another to a virtual KungFu BattleMail,
making moves using SMS to try to outwit their opponents with a series of high kicks and karate chops.
This multiplayer fighting game achieved the heights of success. Since the launch, 25 million challenges
and more than 20,000 fights have taken place across networks, boundaries, and nationalities.
SMS2Email & IM – Mobile Mailbox
Email is the killer app ion the Internet, and is now moving over the mobile networks. With the launch of
services such as MSN Mobile Hotmail and i-mode, users can now entertain themselves with web-based
email services over their mobile phones. Until 2003, more than 110 million Hotmail users were
subscribed to their MSN Hotmail accounts on their mobile phones.
Instant Messaging (IM) is also another attractive service for 2-way instant communication and
entertainment. It is merely a faster version of SMS or email; it also provides information like online
status of the users.
Section 6. Developing SMS-powered applications
Many ways to skin a cat
Until now we have discussed the rich features of wireless messaging applications and their usage in
commercial areas. Lets take a look at how these applications can be developed in real world and using
the lowest possible set of resources.
The application development of SMS-powered application is categorized by handling the middleware
architecture. The sole responsibility of handling wireless messages can be assigned to third-party
vendor, a proprietary SMSC, or can be delivered to personally owned hardware.
Using the third-party
This is the most popular way to make SMS-powered applications. With some amount paid to the
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Application Programming Interface (API) is provided by the vendor, which is then implemented in your
application software. Usually a socket-based Internet connection is established from the application and
message servers. The contents are transferred via Internet from client side to the vendor server, it then
moves forward to the wireless networks. Many third party vendors also provide 2-way messaging
system.
Connecting to SMSC directly
The fastest way to transfer wireless messaging contents is the direct connection to the SMSC, but it
includes many complexities. For example, the SMSC is exposed to any external connection, legal issues
of using the provider resources, maximum connection capability of SMSC and authentication credentials
floating over insecure connections. The communication link between SMSC and application software
can be a TCP/IP network or an X.25 connection.
Use your own hardware
It is a cost effective way to implement lightweight applications within the complete administration of the
application developer. Many hardware products are available that can act as an adapter between the
TCP/IP network and wireless networks. For instance, a GSM modem connected to serial port of a
computer can transfer data to and from GSM networks and pass it to application running on that
computer. However the performance of GSM hardware can be a serious issue during heavy loads of data
transfer.
Section 7. SMS vulnerability analysis
All about wareZ
With the advent of Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS) and SS7 over IP, core GSM network
equipments are more exposed to the malicious attacks. These attacks can cause serious blow on Quality
of Service (QoS), privacy and authenticity of subscribers, and disturbance in normal operations of life.
Numerous vulnerabilities can be found in wireless messaging infrastructure and they can be categorized
according to their environment. The most vulnerable places where the hackers of the future will likely
compromise are:
SMSC-Kernel.
Connection between ESME and SMSC.
Air interface of GSM.
Network Equipments of GSM.
Operating System of mobile phone.
Each category posses its own risk level and payload of the attack can devastate the whole of network.
Until now, no such severe attacks were launched on the wireless messaging systems, but it is only a
matter of time. Below is the discussion of most likely attacks that will occur in the future of wireless
messaging systems.
Denial of Service (DOS) Attack
Most SMSCs are behind the firewall, but that greatly increases the network latency and delay in
message transmission, so vendors do put SMSC exposed to DOS attacks for the sake of high
performance. Nevertheless an improper configured firewall cannot protect an SMSC from DOS attacks,
and talking about Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS), they are the most difficult to defend against.
Service Interruption Attack
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containing several security holes or 0-day exploits that can be used to compromise the target. Like the
“WinNuke” vulnerability of 1997, which causes Windows 95 System to crash when it receives a
specifically formatted TCP header, the SMSC can be on the target of such deliberately crafted SMPP
packets to exploit the holes and bugs in the system.
Service Hijacking Attack
It relates to the gaining of control over the compromised target, what the hackers termed as access to
‘root’. Service Hijacking involves unauthorized access to user that can cause change or loss of data on
the system. This can involve message capturing, alteration of text and block of outgoing packets from
the system.
Buffer Overflow Attack
It can be part of Service Hijacking Attack, to gain control over the box. Buffer Overflow occurs due to
the uncheck bounds in the allocated memory, and that can cause arbitrary instructions to be executed on
the target machine. The Buffer Overflow can be related to the SMSC kernel, the operating system
underlying the SMSC, the database used by SMSC or the type of server used by the SMSC.
Password Compromise Attack
Social Hijacking and Brute Force technique can do a lot in this type of attack. If enough time is given,
the password of SMSC can be detected using trial and error method. Once a password is guessed, it can
cause severe blow to the messaging system. Another way to compromise password is “piggybacking”.
In this type of attack, a hacker first gains access to trusted machines by SMSC, normally a mail server. It
then uses the compromised machine to drive the SMSC according to its will.
Snooping
Snooping or Sniffing, it can capture packets from the network through any kind of sniffer. The captured
packets are decoded and they can give most valuable information. Many advanced sinffers like Ethereal,
can capture SMPP packets along with the capability of tracing the handshakes during the whole session.
This can give the idea what is going on between the ESME and the SMSC.
Spoofing
SMS packets can be created and injected in the network by using any ordinary packet creation utility,
like Nessus that creates packets for TCP/IP network. Spoofing obfuscates the identity of the sender, and
pretends that the message was originated form some other source. Just like there is no check in the
current SMTP messages, a hacker can create a malicious control message under the disguise of trusted
user and can compromise the network.
Radio Frequency Jamming
It is truly a non-Internet based attack that is related to the wireless interface of the communication
system. Its sole purpose is to deny the service from being used by the subscribers in a particular area.
The jamming equipment can be a noise-generating source that emits arbitrary signals in the frequency
spectrum of GSM (normally 900 and 1800 MHz). It not only disrupts the SMS messages but voice calls
can also be affected.
OSS Penetration
The most important part of a GSM network is actually not the Network Equipments themselves but the
Operation and Support System (OSS) itself. It is a network of devices that manage important functions
like billing system environment and those functions are very critical to the security of the GSM. Most
interesting part of OSS is that this infrastructure is accessible via IP, so all the vulnerabilities in the
network are inherited directly into OSS.
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SMS Spam
Unwanted emails are havoc to any online organization. Similarly unsolicited electronic messages
become a nuisance for users of wireless devices. If a wireless provider gets a block of several thousand
subscribers, it can send bulk messages of all the recipients, causing unnecessary traffic load and
disturbance to the recipients. Legal steps have been taken by some governments for spam protection
over wireless, and investment has been done to develop anti-spam systems.
Mobile Virus
It is actually a bug in the mobile equipment software that can allow unauthorized access to programs or
execution of instructions. Most SMS viruses ever noted can cause shutdown and crash of system
software. Examples of other viruses are:
Palm.Phage.A: A Malware affecting PalmOS can range from traditional viruses that infect
executables to malicious code embedded in shared executables. Successful exploitations can range
from device lockup to a low-level device wipe.
Cabir: This worm spreads through a Bluetooth vector on supported platforms, and displays a
warning about the unsigned code upon execution.
Dust: This Malware demonstrates the potential for keystroke logging, remote device control,
process hiding, and covert File Transport Protocol (FTP) server deployment in Windows CE
Operating System.
Brador Trojan: During the first week of August 2004, the first known Pocket PC virus/trojan
utilizing some of the characteristics described in Dust was found in the wild. Two independent
antivirus companies detected and analyzed samples of a backdoor process that can give an
attacker complete control over a Pocket PC mobile device.
SMS Crash
Many text patterns are discovered that can be used to crash the recipient mobile equipment. The flaw
lies not in the SMS packet format, but the operating system of the recipient mobile phone. News from
BBC reported several hundreds of specific model equipment of a mobile phone crashed in Scandinavia
upon receiving a unique pattern of SMS text message.
Section 8. Securing the message
“To the keep!”
Below is a short description of how to secure the wireless messaging applications.
Air Interface Algorithms
GSM level encryption must be enhanced that would be hard to break. Currently used Symmetric
Algorithm encryption ‘A5’ provides radio communication ciphering, and has four levels of encryption.
Recommended level is A5/3 (Note that A5/3 has been broken in 1999).
Proprietary Encryption
Proprietary encryption should be applied for intra-network communication and among network
equipment. This kind of state of the art cryptographic technique is also necessary to keep the data
transfer secure to and from ESME and SMSC.
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SMSC and OSS should be behind well-configured firewalls and their network structure must be kept
hidden from public network as far as it is possible. Modern IDS must be coupled with the network
component to keep them safe from DOS Attacks and Network Scanning.
Secure Socket Layer
For the Internet and Transport layer, SSL and VPN should be used that can reduce the penetration
threats. Moreover a white list of IP addresses should be maintained for the communication among
allowed machines, with proper authentication.
AVs for the mobile?
Finally, to keep the mobile equipments safe from the malicious code, proper virus scanners should be
installed with the mobile operating system, unsigned codes must be disabled.
Section 9. Conclusion
If you think it is secure, think again!
This sums up our discussion on wireless messaging protocols and applications, with the relevant threats
faced by them. Although this is not a complete document, but it focuses the potential targets of the
future panorama. The precautions and security measures can be applied to all level of the system,
ranging from encrypted air interface to hiding the machines behind stateful firewalls and IDS dogwatch.
More sensitive applications like bank account alerts and debit/credit card payment services must be
ensured to keep the verification of the origin of message. No doubt that the network operators will
eventually switch to IP networks in order to overcome bandwidth issues and multimedia messages, and
that decision can open doors to many security threats that linger today due to isolated networks so far.
Wireless Messaging can be very effective medium of communication in the future. With new
technologies like EMS, MMS, LBS, and VR technologies, its perspective can expand manifolds. The
best thing about wireless messaging applications is that it can be developed with no or very little cost,
and easy to implement. However, there is a strong requirement to improve security and
authentication/authorization techniques in SMS based applications.
Section 10. References
[1] Donald J. Longueuil. Wireless Messaging Demystified: SMS, EMS, MMS, IM, and others.
McGraw-Hill Professional Publishing, 2003
[2] The International Engineering Consortium.http://www.iec.net
[3] Kannel Userguide.http://www.kannel.org
[4] SMPP Protocol Sepcification.http://www.smsforum.com
[5] NetSec Mobile Computing Security Threats
[6] SMS over SS7, National Communication System.http://www.comtechnologies.com
[7] SMPP v3.4 Implementation Guide.http://www.smsforum.net
[8] GSM Association Official Documentation
[9] Toni Janveski. Traffic Analysis and Design of Wireless IP Networks. Artech House
[10] Ethereal Network Traffic Analyzer.http://www.ethereal.com
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